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Appellant Karen Marchant herewith submits her Brief in 
reply to the new matters raised by Respondent Donald J. Marchant1s 
Brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his Reply Brief, Donald J. Marchant has attempted to 
hide Judge Tibbs1 misapplication of the law and abuse of discre-
tion behind the veneer that in divorce proceedings, the trial 
judge is vested with "broad discretion" in awarding custody and 
dividing the marital estate. The arguments rely on "broad judi-
cial discretion" to sweep under the carpet the court's failure to 
follow judicial principles of domestic relations law provided by 
the Utah Supreme Court as guidelines for trial courts. 
Additionally, novel concepts of morality are raised. 
As an examplef the Defendant is reduced to interpreting 
the Findings of Fact on custody issues and assuming what the 
court may have intended in its ruling due to the lack of clarity 
and lack of facts stated. These Findings of Fact clearly do not 
provide a "rational and logical factual basis upon which the 
"best interest" of the parties1 children was determined. 
Furtherf the Findings of Fact on custody do not relate to who is 
functionally the best parent to care for the children. The 
interpretation provided by the Respondent does show the basis for 
the moral witch hunt which erroneously deprived Karen Marchant of 
custody of the parties1 children, Brandon and Sarahf after 15 
months of continuous sole custody. 
Defendant's Brief does not address the trial court's 
failure to enter Findings of Fact regarding specific standards 
used in either granting or denying alimony. Defendant states 
that Karen Marchant was "living beyond her means" which is simply 
a misstatement of fact evidenced by Karen Marchant's financial 
statement (Plaintiff's Ex. 3). Again, Defendant attempts to void 
the abuse of discretion by relying on a broad statement that ali-
mony awards will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion occurred. Even under this stan-
dard, it is evident the court's failure to award alimony should 
be overturned. 
With respect to the property awards, Defendant does not 
bother to address two issues raised in Plaintiff's Brief: that 
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the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the 
$20,000.00 personal injury award to Plaintiff which was contri-
buted to the marriage and the court's abuse of discretion in 
awarding 8 percent interest on the pay out of the pension plan 
rather than the statutory 12 percent required by statute. 
Based upon the evidence presented at trial and the Findings of 
Fact entered by the Court, it is clear the trial court prejudi-
cially abused its discretion and misapplied the law to the facts. 
The broad sweeping generalizations of "judicial discretion" 
served up by the Respondent's Brief do not change the trial 
court's errors. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RAISED IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
I. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ON THE CUSTODY ISSUE 
SHOW THAT THE COURT DID NOT MAKE A DETERMINATION 
OF THE "BEST INTERESTS" OF 
BRANDON AND SARAH MARCHANT, MISAPPLIED AND 
DID NOT FOLLOW APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARDS 
AND ACTED BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Defendant recites the standard factors upon which a 
trial court is bound to rely in making custody determinations 
found in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), and 
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). (Brief, pp. 12-13.) 
However, Defendant fails to show where the trial court applied 
these standards to the custody determination which highlights the 
difficulty of upholding the award. Based on the statements in 
the Brief, it is clear that the Defendant had to grasp at straws 
in supporting the court's findings rather than being able to rely 
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on clear factors provided as guidelines by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
In Pusey, Justice Durham stated for the court: 
"We believe that the choice in competing child 
custody claims should instead be based on function-
related factors. Prominent among these, though not 
exclusive, is the identity of the primary caretaker 
during the marriage. Other factors should include 
the identity of the parent with greater flexibility 
to provide personal care for the child and the 
identity of the parent with whom the child has 
spent most of his or her time pending custody 
determination if that period has been lengthy. 
Another important factor should be the stability of 
the environment provided by each parent." Pusey, 
at p. 120. 
None of the Findings of Fact show function-related 
factors warranting an award of custody of the children to 
Defendant. The Findings of Fact actually show an unwavering bias 
towards Mrs. Marchant. 
The Findings of Fact do not provide a logical and legal 
basis for awarding custody to Don Marchant, a requirement for any 
judicial determination. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1986) . 
Since the Findings of Fact do not relate to the prin-
ciples and guidelines supplied by the court, are not 
function-related factors and are simply emblems of prejudice 
towards Mrs. Marchant, the Respondent tries to interpret their 
meaning and makes a variety of interpretations and unwarranted 
assumptions. 
Respondent interprets Findings of Fact 5.B. as follows: 
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"The Finding supports the court1s apparent conclu-
sion [emphasis added], that Mrs. Marchant's 
unjustified acts of selfishness and rebellion and 
her unstable and changing moral values were incon-
sistent with the parental role." Brief, at p. 15. 
This interpretation is certainly unwarrar-i-u 
language of the supported by Mie record. Mrs, 
Marchant's "unjustified acts of selfishness ai.-. -^beilion" wat, 
deciding to obtain a divorce from a man she did not 1ove, with 
whom she was sexually and finai iciall y i ncompatible, who con-
tinually criticized her choice of clothing and who t L ,"io occa-
sion knocked her i. ; as with a blow to the face. This 
Finding does not relate to anything having to do witli the best 
interests of the children. 
Finding of Fact •'.•••;s a prejudicial statement about 
Mrs. Marchant and her ^L-inrt;. r- ; ~o with Mrs. Marchant's sister, 
Helen, who is characterized as b"1.^ a divorced woman". it 
further makes a vague statement, " •-• •. indard of living 
under which Plaintiff has been residing while having temporary 
custody of the children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what it 
should have been nor was it in the best interests of the 
children." 
Respondent interprets this as the Court concluding that 
living with her aunt and cousins under one roof is an 
inappropriate atmosphere in which to raise children and that the 
court "disapproved of the communa.. J restyle." 
This Finding by the Court is not supported by the evi-
dence in the record despite Respondent's novel interpretation of 
the language. Elizabeth Stewart found that the children were 
well adjusted and recommended that the Court maintain the status 
quo. (Defendant's Ex. 9, Recommendation/ p. 3.) No evidence was 
introduced to show any abnormal behavior or below standard living 
conditions. The fact that Helen did some mothering while Mrs. 
Marchant was at work does not support the vague finding that the 
conditions were not what they should have been. The issue is 
immediately raised that if Helen's mothering, who is the 
children's maternal auntf makes the standard of living 
unsuitable, it logically follows that the conditions will be less 
suitable when Mr. Marchant hires an unrelated caretaker for the 
children to fulfill his custody obligations while he is at work. 
Finding of Fact 5.D., that Mrs. Marchant became involved 
with another man in the latter part of the marriage is 
interpreted as reflecting on Mrs. Marchant's "moral character". 
The only evidence offered in the trial was testimony by Mrs. 
Marchant of her friendship with Don Fonnesbeck and Mr. Marchant's 
testimony of an assumed affair of sorts. Mr. Marchant was admit-
tedly jealous of Mrs. Marchant's boss and threatened by his occa-
sional gifts to her which Mrs. Marchant honestly disclosed and 
brought home. There was no evidence of sexual involvement and 
she denied ever having stated she had anything more than a 
friendship with her boss. If she was sexually attracted, the 
evidence shows her moral strength in avoiding sexual relations. 
One thing is clear: The evidence does not show she was immoral 
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in any respect or has a poor no* • •' -• - ei. n'i» evidence on 
her "relationship" with no*. Fonnesbeck, does not ; -.. \e f o the 
function-related fact « :i are to be determined i custody 
issues. 
< ng of Fact 5.C. is accurate in the sense that in 
the latter years of the marriage, Mrs. Marchant decide:! -•- i > to 
work, became involved in her job and was occasionally *-• jn 
weekends which necessitated Don Marchant taking : V children to 
church alone. However, these changes were consistent with Iler 110 
longer iM\in>i her husband and deciding on a divorce and wei not 
motivated by selfishness. testified: 
"My career aspirations were to be a wife and 
mother. And a job is nice and I am grateful that I 
enjoy my work. But I certainly wouldn't term 
myself a career girl or woman, ~r whatever. I am 
grateful that I enjoy my work." (Transcript p. 60# L. 
12-16. ) 
However, she recognized i- t *ie event or divorce, she 
would have to •* to support the children and herself, Find -
that a woman who is unhappy in her marriage and recognizes a need 
to work as "being selfish," is inappropriate by penalizing her 
based on the decision to divorce. In other words, the presump-
tion would be that any person who does not want a divorce or who 
fails to recognize a problem in marriage will be a better care-
taker for the children. This kind of punitive adjudication based 
upon classifications unrelated to child rea: -.'•-* was specifically 
disavowed by the Utah Supreme Court . Pusey v. Pusey, supra., 
which overturned gender-based preferences. TII« unfortunate 
travesty by the court in this matter is that Mrs. Marchant was 
deprived of custody of Sarah and Brandon based upon factors which 
were unrelated to standards and principles which the court has 
stated should control custody determinations. On balance, the 
"prominent function-related factors" in Puseyf strongly favored 
Mrs. Marchant but were ignored entirely by the Court. 
Mrs. Marchant had been the primary caretaker during the 
marriage. Mrs. Marchant had been sole custodial parent for the 
15 months prior to the divorce. Elizabeth Stewart, in her 
evaluation, stated that: 
"There is a preference for leaving the custody 
arrangement in place where it is clear that they 
have made a good adjustment and there is no reason 
to think that they are not doing well or that a 
different custody arrangement would be better for 
them." 
Elizabeth Stewart also states: 
"Since the children are doing well in the mother's 
custody at the present time, the least disruptive 
placement would be to leave them in her custody." 
(Defendant's Ex. 9, Recommendations, p. 3.) 
Where most factors are equal, the court's failure 
to rely on "prominent" factors enunciated by the Utah Supreme 
Court and instead go on a prejudicial "moral" hunt, was an abuse 
of discretion. 
II. 
FAILURE TO AWARD KAREN MARCHANT ALIMONY 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
While Plaintiff agrees with the legal standard to be 
considered by the trial court in making its determination 
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regarding an award of alimony, she wholly disagrees with the 
statement of evidence in the Brief. (Brief, pp. 20-21.) The 
trial court failed to enter Findings of Fact relating to the 
standard. The situation is similar to Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), where the Court noted that the trial 
court had failed to analyze the circumstances of the parties in 
light of the three factors and overturned the court's alimony 
award as being wholly inadequate. 
In his Brief, Donald Marchant admits that he makes 
$793.00 per month net more than the Defendant. However, he indi-
cates that Plaintiff's only indication of "need" was her express 
desire to return to school, which is incorrect. Defendant's 
Financial Declaration (Plaintiff's Ex. 3) shows expenses which 
significantly exceed her income. Even if these expenses are 
reduced by taking the needs of the children away from the 
figuresf her income is still insufficient to meet her minimal 
needs, and this is especially true where she desires to continue 
her education which would be a significant additional expense. 
It is clearly inequitable to have recognized that Karen Marchant 
supported Don Marchant through his schooling during the marriage 
and when Karen Marchant desires further education, to deprive her 
of the ability to obtain that where there is a significant dif-
ference in economic earning power. 
Don Marchant also notes that he is saddled with "the 
lion's share of marital debts totaling $32,800.00." This Court 
should note that the debt on the truck in the amount of 
$11,000.00 was voluntarily assumed under Stipulation by the 
Defendant and he received that property. (Transcript, L. 3-5, 
p.13.) Next, Mr. Marchant assumed a loan in the amount of 
$14,000.00 from his father, M.A. Marchant. His testimony with 
respect to the loan is that he did not sign a Promissory Note for 
that amount and it is payable only "when I can get it". 
(Transcript, L. 6-17, p.104.) Regarding the $5,000.00 amount owed 
on the trailer, Mr. Marchant testified he was selling the trailer 
since he was living in the family's home in Central, Utah, that 
he had previously agreed to pay the debt and presumably would 
relatively quickly be liquidated by the sale of the trailer. 
(Transcript, L. 18-25, p. 26; L. 1-3, p. 77.) The "lion's 
share" of the marital debt, after deducting these items out, 
amounts to $5,800.00. (Defendant's Ex. 10.) 
The Defendant has mischaracterized Karen Marchant's 
income allowing her to live as she desires in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Don Marchant, in his Brief, states that $1,321.00 per 
month of net income of Karen Marchant allowed her to live in the 
area she selected with the children and did not seek temporary 
alimony. Karen was able to do this with the aid of the monthly 
child support payments from Don Marchant in the amount of 
$400.00. Her income for purposes of expenses was, thus, 
increased to $1,721.00 per month. 
The Defendant's assertion that it was evident that both 
parties were living beyond their means is not supported by the 
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record. Karen Marchantfs Financial Declaration (Plaintiff's 
Ex. 3) does not bear this out nor does any other factors or 
statements introduced in the record. In fact, on a comparative 
level, it was clear that Mrs. Marchant was not living according 
to the standard to which she had become accustomed during the 
marriage, in a spacious home provided by her husband. She was 
being forced to share quarters with her sister and nephew to cut 
expenses. 
The court's failure to analyze the standard for awarding 
alimony presents the situation in Jones v. Jones, supra., which 
allows this court to review the factors warranting alimony inde-
pendently. Based on this standard, Karen Marchant is clearly 
entitled to alimony. 
III. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE PROPERTY DIVISION 
Don Marchant's Point IV regarding property distribution 
fails to address two salient issues raised in Karen Marchant1s 
appeal: The trial court failed to consider $20,000.00 in per-
sonal injury awards made to Karen Marchant which were contributed 
to the marriage and the court's awarding 8 percent interest 
rather than 12 percent interest on the Judgment requiring payment 
of one-third of the pension plan money over a ten-year period. 
The court was under an obligation to give due consideration to 
the personal injury awards in dividing the property. Kerr v. 
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980). 
Plaintiff Karen Marchant has addressed the issue of the 
actual amount of marital debt which Don Marchant assumed in the 
immediately preceding portion of this Brief. Examination of 
those debts assumed by Don Marchant only further reinforces Karen 
Marchant1s position that the property award was inequitable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's interpretation for this court of the 
Findings of Fact regarding custody clarify the position of Karen 
Marchant that the court wholly misapplied the law and ignored 
"prominent factors" which clearly were controlling the custody 
issue. The monetary factors and needs of the parties raised by 
the Respondent also clearly indicate the court's abuse of discre-
tion in failing to award alimony to Karen Marchant. Finally, the 
Defendant's failure to address the issues raised in Plaintiff's 
Brief regarding the inequitable property distribution underscores 
the attempt to sweep all abuses of discretion away behind the 
facade of "broad judicial discretion" in domestic relations pro-
ceedings. This Court should reverse the trial court's award of 
custody to Don Marchant, enter an appropriate award of alimony 
and property to Karen Marchant as warranted by the facts. 
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DATED this # day of May, 1987. 
LITTLEFIELB-Tt PETERSON 
iUL WOOD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant Karen S. Marchant 
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